DEMOCRACY: REGRESSION AND RESILIENCE
- Democracy is undergoing significant regression, with rising right-wing populism, foreign interference and disinformation undermining democratic foundations.
- There’s still democratic resilience, evidenced by peaceful transitions of power and successful mobilisations to defend democratic values and practices.
- Civil society plays key roles in monitoring elections, countering disinformation, ensuring inclusive participation and mobilising against regression.
The potential global realignment underway and the decisions being made about conflicts show that political choices matter. The decisions voters make at the ballot box – and those they can’t make when democracy is denied – can have global repercussions.
2024 was hyped as the ‘super election year’, with around half the world’s population having a chance to vote. Seven of the world’s 10 most populous countries held national elections, but only four – India, Indonesia, Mexico and the USA – met the minimal democratic requirement that change via the ballot box was a possibility. Around four in 10 people with a chance to vote lived in countries where the basic conditions for free and fair elections weren’t met, while for many of the rest, the experience was one of flawed, constrained democracy, with only a minority living in flourishing democracies characterised by full respect for civic and political freedoms.
The year demonstrated the vulnerabilities of democracy – to anti-rights narratives, disinformation and foreign interference – but also its resilience and potential to deliver change. While examples abounded of tightly controlled or fraudulent elections maintaining authoritarian control, as in Russia and Venezuela, there were also many examples of peaceful transfers of power, as seen in Botswana and Senegal, and instances of people taking to the streets to successfully defend democracy, including in Guatemala and South Korea.
Where elections were sufficiently free and fair to reflect public sentiment, the result was often the rejection of incumbents and embrace of political novelty, fuelled by economic anger. Right-wing populists and nationalists continued to benefit. The warning signs are there, even in seemingly stable systems, that if mainstream parties don’t connect with public discontent, populist parties will.
Right-wing populism has long moved from the fringes to the political centre stage in many countries, raising the spectre of the return of fascism. As the USA is showing with Trump’s barrage of executive orders, populist leaders can win democratic elections but then pose a significant threat to democracy. This time, people knew what they were voting for and Trump won a majority of the popular vote. He now controls all three branches of government. Trump’s personality may be unique, but his campaign drew heavily from the now-established populist playbook, blending nationalist, anti-immigration and culture-war narratives against a backdrop of economic anxiety.
He’s far from alone. The far right is part of the government formed in the Netherlands in April, after the Party for Freedom came first in the December 2023 election. The party controls key ministries, including on migration and international development. In Croatia, the far-right Homeland Movement entered government following the April parliamentary election.
Even when they don’t reach power, right-wing populists are influencing the political debate, tilting politics in their direction as mainstream parties adapt. They consistently attack excluded groups, independent media and civil society, eroding democratic norms and checks and balances.
Austria’s September election saw the far-right Freedom Party come first with 29 per cent, campaigning on border security and anti-immigration rhetoric. It was only kept out of government by three mainstream parties putting their differences aside to form a coalition but will remain an influential voice from the sidelines. In Germany in September, Alternative for Germany (AfD) became the first far-right party to win the most seats in a state-level election since the Second World War. Though mainstream parties have so far refused coalition agreements with it, the anti-immigrant party strongly influences political debate. In February 2025, the AfD came second in the federal election with its highest-yet national total of over 20 per cent of the vote, and has its eyes on power at the next election.
The far-right National Rally continues to make waves in France, coming first in the European Parliament election in June. President Emmanuel Macron reacted by calling an early parliamentary election. An unusually robust alliance of left-wing parties and civil society mobilised in response, leaving the National Rally disappointed with the final result, although its vote has grown steadily over the years and it hopes to come first next time. In Portugal, the far-right Chega party made a breakthrough with 18 per cent in the March parliamentary election, reflecting discontent with economic stagnation and corruption.
People protest against election irregularities that favoured the ruling party outside parliament in Tbilisi, Georgia, 28 October 2024. Photo by Giorgi Arjevanidze/AFP via Getty Images.
Right-wing populists and nationalists often benefit from concerted disinformation efforts. Russia often plays a major role in election interference efforts, particularly in eastern Europe, aimed at boosting pro-Russia politicians and disrupting pro-European Union (EU) political forces. Civil society plays a crucial role in identifying and countering these efforts, although effectiveness often depends on support from state and international partners.
Far-right nationalist Călin Georgescu unexpectedly won the first round of Romania’s presidential election, capitalising on social media campaigns targeting younger voters disaffected with mainstream politics. But Romania’s Constitutional Court took the extraordinary step of nullifying the results, finding on the basis of declassified intelligence documents that there had been a major Russian campaign of election interference.
Next door, Moldova also experienced significant Russian interference in its presidential election and an EU membership referendum. Tactics included economic pressure, cyberattacks, vote buying, threats of violence and disinformation, including deep-fake videos spread through fake accounts. Voters still backed Moldova’s pro-EU course, but both votes were much closer than expected.
Lithuania, whose government strongly supports Ukraine, faced similar disinformation campaigns during multiple votes, including presidential and legislative elections. Disinformation that mainstream parties planned to introduce compulsory vaccinations played a part in Austria’s election.
Russian interference made an impact in Georgia. The Georgian Dream party, which is increasingly aligned with Russia despite claiming to support EU accession, took victory in October’s parliamentary election amid fraud allegations. The party had previously passed Russian-inspired laws restricting LGBTQI+ advocacy and civil society and media that receive international funding. Pro-Russia disinformation also played a major part in the North Macedonian election, which resulted in a more Russia-aligned government.
Representatives of an AI company that creates deepfake videos for election campaigns show potential customers an avatar of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi speaking in a synthesised voice in Ajmer, India, 15 May 2024. Photo by Himanshu Sharma/picture alliance via Getty Images.
In elections in the Solomon Islands, where the government has embraced partnerships with China, pro-China disinformation was to the fore. It’s little surprise the same happened in Taiwan’s election.
In addition to state-sponsored interference, democratic processes faced unprecedented challenges from disinformation campaigns boosted by AI and social media manipulation. This was a major concern in the year’s biggest election, held in India, with deepfake videos and false claims about the opposition and the country’s Muslim minority aiming to influence voter behaviour. The scale and sophistication of these campaigns posed unprecedented challenges for election officials and fact-checkers.
Disinformation outpaces attempts to control it. It’s now cheaper and easier to spread than ever before. Social media companies simply aren’t doing enough to match the scale and speed of disinformation campaigns, particularly in electoral contexts and when they’re backed by state resources and well-funded individuals. The recent alignment of many social media companies with Trump suggests the problem will only get worse.
In many countries, however, elections simply didn’t matter. Those in power manipulated them, leaving them devoid of any real democratic substance, with incumbency unchallenged.
Russia’s presidential election, held in March, showed how authoritarian power can put electoral processes at its service. After constitutional changes in previous years that allowed Putin to remain in office, the 2024 vote rubber-stamped his continued rule. Opposition candidates were systematically prevented from running through legal technicalities or criminal charge. The figure who would have presented the greatest political threat to Putin, Alexei Navalny, died in suspicious circumstances in an Arctic Circle prison shortly before the election. Independent election monitoring was severely restricted, and state media gave Putin overwhelmingly positive coverage while marginalising or vilifying opponents.
In neighbouring Belarus, Putin’s ally Alexander Lukashenko orchestrated his seventh term through judicial manoeuvres and intense repression. In the run-up to the January 2025 election, the authorities arrested over 1,200 people, many merely for participating in online chats used to organise protests following blatant election fraud in 2020. With no credible opposition allowed, all that was on offer was a staged show.
Venezuela’s July presidential election was one of the year’s saddest examples of democratic hopes dashed by blatant fraud. Despite the government closing civic space and denying the franchise to millions of exiled Venezuelans, turnout was substantial and evidence suggested an opposition landslide. The ruling party refused to release the vote tallies and declared victory without any proof. Subsequent protests faced severe repression, but people still took to the streets during Nicolás Maduro’s third-term inauguration, held amid heightened security measures. Maduro is now rewriting the constitution to tighten his control over a government he doesn’t intend to leave.
Constitutional engineering in the service of authoritarian regimes continues in West Africa. Recent changes in Togo established a parliamentary system in which the president of the Council of Ministers is chosen by parliament rather than popular vote. This change enables Faure Gnassingbé, president since 2005, to extend his family’s decades-long grip on power. The government’s response to protests was to ban them, disrupt civil society gatherings, arbitrarily arrest protesters and criminalise journalists covering the dissent.
North Africa also saw clear instances of manipulation. For Algeria’s September election, the date was moved to make it harder for opponents to stand and campaign, while many activists, journalists and opposition politicians were jailed and civil society organisations (CSOs) and independent media were shut down. With no real opposition, President Abdelmadjid Tebboune was able to claim an implausible 94.65 per cent of the vote.
In Tunisia, President Kais Saied held onto power in October having systematically changed laws to dismantle democratic checks and balances. His government has imprisoned opponents, vilified critics as foreign agents and focused populist anger on migrants and refugees to distract from economic failures. With a highly limited choice on offer, turnout was incredibly low.
In El Salvador, President Nayib Bukele won re-election by a landslide. But the contest wasn’t fair, since Bukele was able to run thanks to judicial manoeuvres that violated the constitution and abused state media and resources. While his tough policies against gang violence have won him popular support, they have meant the mass imprisonment of tens of thousands based on little evidence, with flagrant disregard for due process and basic human rights protections. With judicial independence crumbling and constitutional safeguards dismantled, El Salvador is sliding into autocracy.
Military rule remains the particular strain of authoritarian governance in several African states.
In Burkina Faso, the ruling junta postponed elections indefinitely, saying they weren’t a priority, and a heavily repressed civil society could do little about it. Guinea’s military junta also missed another deadline for democratic transition at the start of 2025, sparking protests that the state met with repression. It’s a similar story in Mali, where the military junta, in power since 2021, postponed elections again, changed the constitution to expand presidential powers, consolidated control by suspending all political party and civil society activities and offset international criticism by strengthening its ties with Russia.
Chad held elections, but only to lend a veneer of legitimacy to authoritarian rule. In a context of severely restricted civic space and minimal competition, victory predictably went to Mahamat Idriss Déby, who took power in a military coup in 2021 after his father’s death. The most prominent challenger was killed in suspicious circumstances before the vote.
In Rwanda too, elections serve to disguise authoritarian control with no space for dissent. President Paul Kagame still has much domestic support, but his regime has become increasingly repressive, with critics facing consequences ranging from criminalisation and harassment to forced exile. And even exile doesn’t bring safety, as dissidents are at risk of assassination and forced return to Rwanda. The July general election was held with minimal competition following a systematic crackdown on civic space. Widespread fraud allegations ensued.
Fraud allegations dogged votes in other African countries, including Comoros, Mauritania and Mozambique. Post-election protests in Mozambique were met with lethal security force violence.
In Central Asia, Uzbekistan’s parliamentary election was also a staged procedure lacking any substance. In the Middle East, Kuwait’s parliamentary election in April and Jordan’s in September took place in carefully managed political environments that maintained the appearance of participation while ensuring regime stability. Iran’s multiple votes – two rounds each of parliamentary and presidential elections – displayed the theocratic regime’s tight control of political participation. The July presidential election, following the death of President Raisi, saw a reformist ex-health minister defeat an ultra-conservative former nuclear negotiator – but ultimate power remains with the unelected Supreme Leader.
In Pakistan’s restricted civic space, an election produced a result the country’s powerful military neither wanted nor expected, when candidates aligned with jailed ex-Prime Minister Imran Khan won the most seats. The military did everything it could to block Khan’s party, but many voters seized the opportunity to express their dissatisfaction with military power and economic strife. The two mainstream parties then joined forces to prevent an inconvenient outcome for the military, enabling it to keep undermining the democratic process.
In contrast, when democracies prove more resilient, it often goes unnoticed. Systems that work as intended don’t make headlines. But examples abound of democratic institutions quietly withstanding pressure and doing their job of ensuring the conditions where people have a voice. Robust civil society action has defended and strengthened democracy in some challenging contexts.
In 2024, several democratic countries held elections that uncontroversially delivered a change of government, often arising from discontent over inflation, unemployment, corruption and inequality, as seen in Ghana, Sri Lanka and the UK, although right-wing populists have also established themselves in British politics.
People celebrate outside Downing Street as the Labour Party replaces the Conservative government after 14 years in power in London, UK, 5 July 2024. Photo by Mike Kemp/In Pictures via Getty Images.
Botswana passed a key test when an opposition coalition unseated the liberation-era Botswana Democratic Party after 58 years in power. The outgoing president conceded defeat and the transition was peaceful. Similarly in South Africa, the African National Congress, the party in power since the advent of democracy, now has to share power as part of a 10-party coalition. In India and Japan incumbents also shed support and were forced to form coalitions. The less-than-overwhelming win scored by India’s strongman Prime Minister Narendra Modi, despite an intense propaganda campaign that projected Modi as an omnipresent all-powerful figure, may offer civil society and the Muslim minority an opportunity to reverse attacks on human rights and strengthen democratic freedoms.
Democracy also prevailed in Taiwan, where the geopolitical stakes are high. A successful vote showed that democratic practices can prevail despite external pressures and foreign disinformation campaigns. In contrast, elections drove Indonesia toward more authoritarian rule under Prabowo Subianto, a former general accused of human rights abuses, while Maldives and the Solomon Islands reoriented towards China amid restrictions on key freedoms.
Elsewhere, civil society action played a vital role in making democracy a reality. Senegal’s civil society successfully mobilised against the incumbent’s attempt to postpone elections and unconstitutionally extend his mandate. The vote was held following a court order and an opposition leader recently released from jail won the presidency. The outcome illustrated the determination of Senegal’s large youth population to make their voices heard.
South Korea’s democracy survived a severe test when President Yoon Suk Yeol reacted to political difficulties by declaring martial law, claiming he was protecting the country from North Korean forces and ‘anti-state elements’. Following widespread public protests, parliament rapidly suspended and impeached him. Yoon evidently didn’t count on the resolve of South Korean people to use their civil rights to defend democracy.
Thousands of protesters march to demand the presidential election is held without delay in Dakar, Senegal, 17 February 2024. Photo by Cem Ozdel/Anadolu via Getty Images.
Bangladesh’s January election initially appeared to cement authoritarian rule when Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina secured her fourth consecutive term amid an intense crackdown on opposition. But months later, mass student-led protests ended her 15-year rule. The interim government, led by Nobel Peace Prize winner Mohammed Yunus, includes protest leaders and civil society representatives.
Guatemala’s democratic transition, though turbulent, resulted in the inauguration of Bernardo Arévalo as president despite repeated attempts by entrenched elites to prevent it. As a political outsider leading a party born out of anti-corruption protests, Arévalo’s victory and inauguration were the result of sustained civil society mobilisation, combined with international democratic solidarity.
Steps forward in representation were taken when Namibia and Mexico elected their first female leaders, although there were concerns about the fairness of the Namibian vote, while Mexico’s election was marred by political violence and attempts to concentrate power, raising concerns about the long-term health of democracy.
Several trends are evident. Authoritarian regimes are increasingly employing sophisticated electoral manipulation techniques and distorting constitutional and legal frameworks to maintain power under a veneer of democratic legitimacy. In 2024, this was particularly evident in Central Asia and several African countries where formal elections were held but with no real competition.
Democratic backsliding is often achieved through seemingly legal means, with democratic institutions and processes maintained but hollowed out. Disinformation and social media manipulation accelerate this erosion, creating information environments where people struggle to distinguish fact from fiction.
Civil society is however proving itself a crucial defender of democratic norms, with successful mobilisations in countries including Bangladesh, Guatemala and South Korea showing that authoritarian trajectories can be arrested. The implication may be that it’s easier to stop regression when it’s happening than reverse it once authoritarianism has consolidated.
CSOs play vital roles in supporting democratic processes. They serve as watchdogs, advocates and educators, monitoring election integrity, combating disinformation, facilitating voter registration and ensuring excluded groups can participate.
Civil society’s work extends well beyond elections. Efforts to engage people in governance processes, hold power accountable and build reform coalitions represent the quiet, often unheralded work that sustains democracy. CSOs are increasingly focusing on digital literacy and media education, helping people navigate complex information environments while offering spaces for dialogue across political divides. In regions experiencing democratic backsliding, civil society often serves as the last line of defence for maintaining civic space and supporting excluded groups, frequently at considerable risk.
To confront global democratic decline more effectively, efforts should prioritise the protection of democracies against backsliding. Strategies should embrace diverse perspectives and mobilise broad coalitions that cross ideological divides. Pro-democracy narratives must move beyond abstract concepts and make clear how democracy can lead to better standards of living and security.
There’s a need to tackle the sources of distortion of democracy. This includes elite wealth, which plays an outsized role in political power, and the barrage of technological developments that are supercharging the disinformation game, which demand adequate regulation with strong human rights safeguards.
In a time of collapsing civil society resourcing, funding sources need to reorient around providing more flexible, long-term support for the grassroots movements that help sustain democracy.
2024 has shown that democracy faces serious challenges, but it has significant capacity for renewal. The key to democratic resilience lies in building stronger connections between formal democratic structures and grassroots civic engagement. Efforts will need to keep evolving in response to authoritarian creep and its increasingly sophisticated tactics. Civil society action can make the difference between democratic recession deepening or reversing.